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Exclusive Dealing and Its Effects: The Impact of Large Music Festivals on Local Music Venues

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  • R. Hiller

Abstract

This paper examines how local music venues are affected by exclusive contracts used by four of the United States’ most prominent music festivals. By utilizing a unique industry and multi-year dataset, as well as variation in the use of exclusive dealing across the country determined by the location of large music festivals, this paper adds to the paucity of empirical analysis of exclusive dealing and provides new insight into an ignored sector of the music industry. Results show that exclusive contracts correlate with a decrease in the number of venues in affected cities by 7–28 % when compared to those unaffected cities, with smaller cities being disproportionately affected. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • R. Hiller, 2014. "Exclusive Dealing and Its Effects: The Impact of Large Music Festivals on Local Music Venues," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 45(2), pages 153-175, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:45:y:2014:i:2:p:153-175
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-014-9428-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Luc Champarnaud & Amandine Ghintran & Frédéric Jouneau-Sion, 2021. "‘NEXT’ events: a cooperative game theoretic view to festivals," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(4), pages 517-548, November.
    2. Muriel Fadairo & Jianyu Yu, 2014. "Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing ; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks," Working Papers 1405, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Fadairo, Muriel & Yu, Jianyu & Lanchimba, Cintya, 2017. "The Choice of Exclusive Dealing: Economic Rationales and Evidence from French Retail Chains," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 317-335.

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