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Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?

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Author Info
Slade, Margaret E

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Abstract

In 1989, the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14,000 public houses. The MMC claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice. Since that time, however, retail prices have risen. This paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period. The analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail-organizational form that emphasizes how exclusive-dealing clauses and strategic factors interact.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 108 (1998)
Issue (Month): 448 (May)
Pages: 565-602
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:108:y:1998:i:448:p:565-602

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  2. G. Rossini, 2004. "Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium," Working Papers 527, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis, 2001. "Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ana, MAULEON & José, SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005. "Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2003. "Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains," CEPR Discussion Papers 3976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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