Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France
AbstractWe use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average. Copyright Springer 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
Contractual Choices; Public-Private Partnerships; Public Services; Transaction Costs; Water supply; H0; H7; K00; L33;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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