Competitive Bidding for a Long-term Electricity Distribution Contract
AbstractDemsetz (1968) advocated competitive bidding as a replacement for natural monopoly regulation. Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) argued that these problems of natural monopoly regulation are inherent in long-term investment under uncertainty, and that both long- and short-term franchising contracts may be more problematic than regulation. Williams illustrated this argument with the problems experienced in bidding to provide cable TV in Oakland. London Underground recently put out top tender to provide cable (thirty-year) contract for operation, maintenance, repair and renewal of its electricity distribution network. The evidence of this contract suggests that competitive bidding to provide a natural monopoly service is feasible and advantageous. The problems in Oakland CATV case were not encountered. However, the contract involves considerable resources to formulate and monitor, and envisages repeated modification and additional works. The possibility of competitive contracting to replace or supplement utility network regulation deserves further consideration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0112.
Date of creation: Jul 2001
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franchise bidding; contracting out; natural monopoly; electricity; regulation; Public Fianance Initiative;
Other versions of this item:
- Littlechild Stephen, 2002. "Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, March.
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
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- NEP-ALL-2001-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2001-07-23 (Energy Economics)
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- NEP-NET-2001-07-23 (Network Economics)
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