Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract
AbstractDemsetz (1968) and Posner (1972) suggested competitive bidding as an alternative to natural monopoly regulation. Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) argued that the problems of natural monopoly regulation are inherent in long-term investment under uncertainty. Long- and short-term franchising contracts may be more problematic than regulation. This paper reviews the literature and UK experience. It examines London Underground's recent long-term (thirty-year) contract for its electricity distribution network. This has avoided the Oakland CATV problems described by Williamson, but involves considerable resources to monitor. Competitive contracting seems feasible and advantageous versus public provision. Its merits versus utility regulation warrant further consideration.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Other versions of this item:
- Littlechild, S.C., 2001. "Competitive Bidding for a Long-term Electricity Distribution Contract," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0112, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
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