Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Simple money-based tests for choosing between private and public delivery: a discussion of the issues

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paul Grout

    ()

  • Silvia Sonderegger

    ()

Abstract

The decision when to provide services by the public sector and when to use the private sector is a fundamental one. The economic literature emphasises that the efficiency of the mechanisms of delivery will depend on the contractual nature of what can be achieved by the parties and the political economy forces. Totally separate from this literature, however, governments have tried to implement practical and simple tests to indicate when to use private and when to use public delivery methods. The aim of this paper is to address some of the issues associated with simple money-based tests. Copyright Springer 2006

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-006-9111-y
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 93-126

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:93-126

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336

Related research

Keywords: Public–private partnerships; Concession contracts; Regulation; D78; L50;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Han Hong, 2000. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1628, Econometric Society.
  3. Grout, Paul A. & Zalewska, Anna, 2006. "The impact of regulation on market risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 149-184, April.
  4. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Not-For-Profit Entrepreneurs," NBER Working Papers 6810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Brealey, R A & Cooper, I A & Habib, M A, 1997. "Investment Appraisal in the Public Sector," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 12-28, Winter.
  7. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer.
  8. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2002. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 871-898.
  9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
  10. Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  11. Arrow, Kenneth J & Lind, Robert C, 1970. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 364-78, June.
  12. Sandmo, Agnar & Dreze, Jacques H, 1971. "Discount Rates for Public Investment in Closed and Open Economies," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 38(152), pages 395-412, November.
  13. Richard Disney & Amanda Gosling, 1998. "Does it pay to work in the public sector?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(4), pages 347-374, November.
  14. Littlechild, S.C., 2001. "Competitive Bidding for a Long-term Electricity Distribution Contract," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0112, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  15. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024, July.
  16. Paul A Grout & Margaret Stevens, 2003. "Financing and Managing Public Services: An Assessment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/076, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  17. Daniel J. Graham & Stephen Glaister, 2002. "The Demand for Automobile Fuel: A Survey of Elasticities," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, January.
  18. Paul A. Grout, 2003. "Public and Private Sector Discount Rates in Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C62-C68, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:93-126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.