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Elections vs. political competition: The case of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

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  • Marta Podemska-Mikluch

Abstract

In models of political economy, institutionalization of free and open elections is presented as infusing competition into a monopolized regime. Due to elections, representative democracies are thought to reflect the will of the majority as opposed to the will of the elites. I challenge the idea that elections are a necessary condition of a well-functioning democratic system. In the liberal system of nobles’ democracy in the Kingdom in Poland, noble masses were able to shape political outcomes despite the absence of elections. In fact, it was the adoption of free royal elections in 1573 that undermined the democratic regime and contributed to the demise of the country. I argue that nobles’ democracy emerged from competition between the king and the regional rulers for the loyalty of nobles and that the system collapsed when royal elections disincentivized kings from seeking the nobles’ support. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

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  • Marta Podemska-Mikluch, 2015. "Elections vs. political competition: The case of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 167-178, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:28:y:2015:i:2:p:167-178
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-014-0266-8
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    1. Leonid Krasnozhon & Mykola Bunyk, 2019. "Liberalism and great upheaval: What did classical liberals do in the Tsarist Russia?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 96-113, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Degeneracy; Democracy; Institutional competition; Kingdom of Poland; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Royal elections; B25; B53; D85; N43; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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