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La economía política de la política fiscal

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  • Jorge M. Streb
  • Gustavo Torrens

Abstract

La política fiscal es el resultado de un proceso de decisión colectivo. Este proceso está más institucionalizado en las democracias constitucionales donde es clave la competencia electoral entre partidos para definir qué políticas se van a llevar a cabo. Si bien el votante mediano es gravitante en las elecciones regidas por un sistema mayoritario de simple pluralidad de sufragios, donde hay un incentivo estratégico para que la competencia electoral se concentre en dos partidos políticos, diversas razones llevan incluso en este ámbito a la divergencia de las políticas propuestas e implementadas por los diferentes partidos. El gobierno dividido, donde los votantes no dan el control de las decisiones a un único partido, es una forma de evitar la volatilidad de políticas y puede llevar a políticas más cercanas al mediano. Incluso las autocracias pueden estar sujetas a ciertos límites para sobrevivir políticamente. Recientemente se empezaron a modelar los factores específicos que ayudan a explicar por qué se produce la democratización.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 455.

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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:455

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Related research

Keywords: votante mediano; convergencia; divergencia; volatilidad de políticas; actores de veto;

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