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Dyads, triads, and the theory of exchange: Between liberty and coercion

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  • Marta Podemska-Mikluch
  • Richard Wagner

Abstract

Economists commonly use the Edgeworth box to illustrate the ability of exchange to generate gains from trade. In contrast to this framework of dyadic exchange, we explore triadic forms of exchange where margins of coercion are also present. In the presence of triadic exchange, market transactions are no longer wholly voluntary and instead reflect an admixture of liberty and coercion. We illustrate triadic exchange in the context of credit markets, showing how continual turbulence is a sign of neither market failure nor government failure but is rather a systemic quality of triadic exchange as a system of societal governance. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Podemska-Mikluch & Richard Wagner, 2013. "Dyads, triads, and the theory of exchange: Between liberty and coercion," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 171-182, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:26:y:2013:i:2:p:171-182
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-012-0180-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Marta Podemska-Mikluch, 2021. "Taxonomy of Entrepreneurship – A Means-Oriented Approach," Studies in Public Choice, in: David J. Hebert & Diana W. Thomas (ed.), Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy, pages 63-72, Springer.
    2. Richard Wagner & Deema Yazigi, 2014. "Form vs. substance in selection through competition: elections, markets, and political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 503-514, June.
    3. Huck, Nicolas & Mavoori, Hareesh & Mesly, Olivier, 2020. "The rationality of irrationality in times of financial crises," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 337-350.
    4. Richard Wagner, 2018. "Trade, Power, and Political Economy: Reason vs. Ideology in Edward Stringham’s Private Governance," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(2), pages 245-255, June.
    5. Nicolás Cachanosky & Edward J. Lopez, 2020. "Rediscovering Buchanan’s rediscovery: non-market exchange versus antiseptic allocation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 461-477, June.
    6. Richard E. Wagner, 2019. "American Democracy and the Problem of Fiscal Deficits," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 15(2), pages 199-216, December.
    7. Meg Patrick & Richard Wagner, 2015. "From mixed economy to entangled political economy: a Paretian social-theoretic orientation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 103-116, July.
    8. Richard E. Wagner, 2019. "The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: a masterful compendium," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 467-479, December.
    9. Paul Dragos Aligica & Richard E. Wagner, 2020. "Economic coordination in environments with incomplete pricing," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 315-329, September.
    10. Jonathan W. Plante, 2022. "Richard E. Wagner, Macroeconomics as Systems Theory: Transcending the Micro-Macro Dichotomy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Xiii +313 pages. 119.99 USD (hardback)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 35(4), pages 561-566, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Edgeworth box; Dyadic exchange; Triadic exchange; Coercive exchange; Credit markets as coercive exchange; Conflict and political economy; D23; D51; D74; D86; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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