Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective
AbstractThe economic approach to politics revolutionized the way scholars in economics and political science approached the study of political decision-making by introducing the possibility of government failure. However, the persistent and consistent application of neoclassical models of economics also seemed to suggest that once the full costs were accounted for, this failure was an illusion. This paper counters these arguments, typically associated with George Stigler, Gary Becker and Donald Wittman, by focusing on the underlying economic theory. We develop an alternative model of political economy grounded in the Austrian conception of the dynamic market process. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Entrepreneurship; Government failure; Market failure; Market process; Public choice; B52; B53; H11;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Boettke, Peter J, 2002. " Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of its Uniqueness," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 263-74, December.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
- Rowley, Charles K, 1997. " Donald Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure: Review Article," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 15-26, July.
- Ikeda, Sanford, 2003. " How Compatible Are Public Choice and Austrian Political Economy?," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 63-75, March.
- Reder, Melvin W, 1982. "Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1982.
"Barriers to Entry,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 47-57, March.
- Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-68, October.
- Boettke, Peter J & Lopez, Edward J, 2002. " Austrian Economics and Public Choice," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 111-19, June.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
- Sutter, Daniel, 2002. " The Democratic Efficiency Debate and Definitions of Political Equilibrium," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 199-209, June.
- Meir Kohn, 2004. "Value and Exchange," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 24(3), pages 303-339, Fall.
- Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
- Facchini, François & Melki, Mickaël, 2013.
"Efficient government size: France in the 20th century,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-14.
- François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal government size and economic growth in France (1871-2008) : An explanation by the State and market failures," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00654363, HAL.
- François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal Government Size and Economic Growth in France (1871-2008): An explanation by the State and Market Failures," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2012.
"Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006,"
Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 155-179, January.
- Potrafke, Niklas, 2009. "Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006," MPRA Paper 23751, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne, 2009. "Best case, worst case, and the golden mean in political economy: An introduction to a symposium on Tim Besley’s principled agents? The political economy of good government," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 123-125, June.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00654363 is not listed on IDEAS
- Revold Entov & Alexander Radygin, 2012. "Failures of the State: Theory and Policy," Working Papers 0053, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.