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An experimental analysis of the effects of automated mitigation procedures on investment and prices in wholesale electricity markets

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  • Lynne Kiesling

    ()

  • Bart Wilson

    ()

Abstract

In this paper we report the findings of an economic experiment that examines the effects of an automated mitigation procedure (AMP) on prices and capacity investment choices of suppliers in a wholesale electricity market. Specifically, we examine the effects of different market power incentives on markets with and without an AMP. While we find that the AMP does not affect overall investment in capacity, the most significant determinant of long-run prices is investment in new capacity. The AMP also does not reduce long-run prices relative to markets without an AMP. Furthermore, our participants successfully manipulated the AMP’s trigger price. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-006-9018-4
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 313-334

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:31:y:2007:i:3:p:313-334

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

Related research

Keywords: Electric power markets; Automated mitigation procedures; investment; Price caps; C92; L11; L94;

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References

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  1. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
  2. Borenstein, Severin, 2000. "Understanding Competitive Pricing and Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 49-57, July.
  3. Dean V. Williamson & Céline Jullien & Lynne Kiesling & Carine Staropoli, 2006. "Investment Incentives and Market Power: An Experimental Analysis," EAG Discussions Papers 200605, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  4. Steven L. Puller, 2007. "Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(1), pages 75-87, February.
  5. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1999. "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 805-826, September.
  6. Borenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 285-323, September.
  7. Holt, Charles A, 1989. "The Exercise of Market Power in Laboratory Experiments," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages S107-30, October.
  8. Kahn, Alfred E., 2002. "The Adequacy of Prospective Returns on Generation Investments under Price Control Mechanisms," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 37-46, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hans-Theo Normann & Roberto Ricciuti, 2009. "Laboratory Experiments For Economic Policy Making," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 407-432, 07.
  2. Rimvydas Baltaduonis, 2007. "An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization," Working papers 2007-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  3. Henze, B. & Noussair, C.N. & Willems, Bert, 2011. "Regulation of Network Infrastructure Investments: An Experimental Evaluation," Discussion Paper 2011-035, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Christian Vossler & Timothy Mount & Robert Thomas & Ray Zimmerman, 2009. "An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 44-59, August.
  5. Rimvydas Baltaduonis, 2007. "Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets," Working papers 2007-14, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  6. Arango, Santiago & Larsen, Erik, 2011. "Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2457-2466, May.

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