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Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’?

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  • Alphons Kragt
  • Robyn Dawes
  • John Orbell

Abstract

In experimental games, as in natural situations, people are often observed acting to the benefit of others even at considerable cost to themselves. Such behavior is contrary to the assumption of selfish behavior, but it is not necessarily contrary to the assumption of rationality: People cooperating under these circumstances could be ‘rational altruists’ who base their decision on the magnitude of the external benefit, as well as on the costs to themselves. We test that proposition using a prisoners' dilemma experimental paradigm. If it is correct, we should observe higher levels of cooperation as the external benefit in such games increases. But we do not — whether external benefit is measured in terms of number of individuals benefiting from a cooperative choice or the total dollar benefit produced. Cooperation must be explained otherwise. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Alphons Kragt & Robyn Dawes & John Orbell, 1988. "Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 233-247, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:56:y:1988:i:3:p:233-247
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00130273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Orbell, John M. & Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Simmons, Randy T., 1984. "Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 147-162, March.
    2. Rapoport, Amnon, 1985. "Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 148-155, March.
    3. Dennis Mueller, 1986. "Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 3-23, January.
    4. van de Kragt, Alphons J. C. & Orbell, John M. & Dawes, Robyn M., 1983. "The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 112-122, March.
    5. Dawes, Robyn M. & Orbell, John M. & Simmons, Randy T. & Van De Kragt, Alphons J. C., 1986. "Organizing Groups for Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1171-1185, December.
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    1. Powell, J.P., 2010. "The limits of economic self-interest : The case of open source software," Other publications TiSEM fc6d2aa1-8b29-40be-b888-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. David Goetze & Peter Galderisi, 1989. "Explaining collective action with rational models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 25-39, July.
    3. Albert Martin, 2004. "A Plea for a Behavioural Approach in the Science of Human Resources Management," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 15(2), pages 201-214.
    4. Grandner, Thomas, 1996. "Territoriale Evolution von Kooperation in einem Gefangenendilemma," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 45, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    5. Schubert, Renate & Blasch, Julia, 2010. "Sustainability standards for bioenergy--A means to reduce climate change risks?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 2797-2805, June.

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