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Ignoring the Electoral College: why public choice economists understate the probability of decisive voters

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  • Dwight R. Lee

    (Ball State University)

Abstract

When considering the probability of voters being decisive in presidential elections, public choice economists typically proceed as if the probability can reasonably be approximated by assuming that the winner is determined by simple majority vote. It is well known the Electoral College can cause presidential candidates to lose elections despite winning the popular vote (an election inversion). But the Electoral College’s ability to increase the probability of some voters being decisive effectively has been ignored, despite such increases having occurred in 10 of the last 49 presidential elections. By examining the influence of the Electoral College in most of the presidential elections from 1824 to 2016, I explain and give examples of how the probabilities of some voters being decisive were elevated above what they would have been under majority rule, with the increase being truly astounding in several cases. The examples do not weaken the importance of expressive voting, but our understanding of such voting is improved by considering the probability effects of the Electoral College on voter decisiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Dwight R. Lee, 2021. "Ignoring the Electoral College: why public choice economists understate the probability of decisive voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 439-454, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:187:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00787-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00787-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicholas Miller, 2012. "Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 1-25, January.
    2. Nathaniel Beck, 1975. "A note on the probability of a tied election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-79, September.
    3. Andrew Gelman & Nate Silver & Aaron Edlin, 2012. "What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 321-326, April.
    4. David Stromberg, 2008. "How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of Being Florida," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 769-807, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral College; Decisive voters; Decisive states; Expressive voting; Binomial distributions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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