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Rational Actor Theory in Politics: A Critical Review of John Quiggin

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  • GEOFFREY BRENNAN
  • JONATHAN PINCUS

Abstract

John Quiggin's paper attacks public‐choice theory. among other things, for its us? of the assumption of ‘rational egoism’. The object of our response is twofold. First. to distinguish egoism from rationality, and to indicate that rationality postulates, when faithfully applied, provide reasons for believing that political behaviour and market behaviour will be systematically different, and specifically that the former will be less egoistic than the latter. Second, to indicate that comparative static propasitions in public‐choice theory (and in economics more generally) can be sustained on rather weaker behavioural assumptions than homo economicus embodies, and that consequently some of the public‐choice orthodoxy would survive any attack on the egoism assumption.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffrey Brennan & Jonathan Pincus, 1987. "Rational Actor Theory in Politics: A Critical Review of John Quiggin," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 63(1), pages 22-32, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:63:y:1987:i:1:p:22-32
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1987.tb00634.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James, 1981. "The normative purpose of economic "science": Rediscovery of an eighteenth century method," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 155-166, December.
    2. Nathaniel Beck, 1975. "A note on the probability of a tied election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-79, September.
    3. Brennan, Geoffrey, 1973. "Pareto desirable redistribution: the case of malice and envy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 173-183, April.
    4. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James, 1983. "Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369), pages 89-105, March.
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    1. Quiggin, John, 2004. "The Y2K Scare: Causes, Costs and Cures," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151503, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2013. "The Weak Rationality Principle in Economics," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 149(I), pages 1-26, March.
    3. William J. Martin, 1990. "Public Choice Theory And Australian Agricultural Policy Reform," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 34(3), pages 189-211, December.
    4. Coggins, Jay S., 1994. "Trade and the Food Industries: Public and Social Choice," Staff Papers 200577, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.

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