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Pareto-minimality in the jungle

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  • Bertrand Crettez

    (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II)

Abstract

We consider the simplest version of a jungle economy à la Piccione-Rubinstein, wherein as many agents as goods are assumed, agents consume at most one indivisible good, and a transitive strong power relation exists. We first study the wilderness of jungle equilibria, i.e., whether they are Pareto-minimal (an allocation is Pareto-minimal if it is impossible to reduce the welfare of one agent without increasing the welfare of another). We show that jungle equilibria are not necessarily Pareto-minimal. We then study and characterize the set of Pareto-minimal jungle equilibria. Second, we tackle the case of equally powerful people, in contrast to the assumption that the power relation is asymetric. Assuming specifically a transitive weak power relation, we show that jungle equilibria exist, but that they are not always unique, nor Pareto-optimal. We also provide conditions under which those equilibria are Pareto-minimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez, 2020. "Pareto-minimality in the jungle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 495-508, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00677-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00677-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Involuntary exchange; Jungle economy; Jungle equilibria; Pareto-minimal; Power relation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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