Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9320-z
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, December.
- Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2007. "The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 243-247, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2016. "The Political Game of European Fisheries Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 745-763, April.
- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Margrethe Aanesen & Claire Armstrong, 2013. "Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 320-338, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2006.
"Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1193-1224, September.
- Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2004. "Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation," NBER Working Papers 10764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas J. Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2004. "Shocks and government beliefs: the rise and fall of American inflation," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Horváth, Roman & Jonášová, Júlia, 2015.
"Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 229-243.
- Roman Horvath & Júlia Jonasova, 2014. "Central Banks Voting Records, Financial Crisis and Future Monetary Policy," Working Papers IES 2014/35, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Dec 2014.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018.
"Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
- Stephen Eliot Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2014. "Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: A computational linguistics approach," Economics Working Papers 1425, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Prat, Andrea & McMahon, Michael & Hansen, Stephen, 2014. "Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: a Computational Linguistics Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2014. "Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," CEP Discussion Papers dp1276, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Prat, Andrea, 2014. "Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58072, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2014. "Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: a Computational Linguistics Approach," Working Papers 762, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Prat, Andrea, 2014. "Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60287, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2014. "Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: a Computational Linguistics Approach," Discussion Papers 1411, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
- Bordo, Michael & Istrefi, Klodiana, 2023.
"Perceived FOMC: The making of hawks, doves and swingers,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 125-143.
- Michael Bordo, Klodiana Istrefi, 2018. "Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves and Swingers," Working papers 683, Banque de France.
- Michael D. Bordo & Klodiana Istrefi, 2018. "Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves and Swingers," NBER Working Papers 24650, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008.
"Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees,"
International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 213-233, March.
- RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2007. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," Cahiers de recherche 2007-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2007. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," Cahiers de recherche 05-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Ayse Kaya & Stephen Golub & Mark Kuperberg & Feng Lin, 2019. "The Federal Reserve'S Dual Mandate And The Inflation‐Unemployment Tradeoff," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 641-651, October.
- Johnson, Eric D. & Ellis, Michael A. & Kotenko, Diana, 2012. "Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 368-371.
- Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016.
"Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting,"
IWH Discussion Papers
15/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016. "Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145803, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Arias, Jonas E. & Caldara, Dario & Rubio-Ramírez, Juan F., 2019.
"The systematic component of monetary policy in SVARs: An agnostic identification procedure,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 1-13.
- Jonas E. Arias & Dario Caldara & Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez, 2014. "The Systematic Component of Monetary Policy in SVARs: An Agnostic Identification Procedure," Working Papers 2014-13, FEDEA.
- Juan Rubio-Ramirez & Dario Caldara & Jonas Arias, 2015. "The Systematic Component of Monetary Policy in SVARs: An Agnostic Identification Procedure," 2015 Meeting Papers 359, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jonas E. Arias & Dario Caldara & Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez, 2016. "The Systematic Component of Monetary Policy in SVARs: An Agnostic Identification Procedure," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Jonas E. Arias & Dario Caldara & Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez, 2015. "The Systematic Component of Monetary Policy in SVARs: An Agnostic Identification Procedure," International Finance Discussion Papers 1131, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008.
"Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2008-2, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Blinder, Alan S. & Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel & de Haan, Jakob & Jansen, David-Jan, 2008. "Central Bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and evidence," Working Paper Series 898, European Central Bank.
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1038, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2013. "Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members," Working Paper 2013/03, Norges Bank.
- Farvaque, Etienne & Matsueda, Norimichi & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2009.
"How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 534-546, December.
- Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2011.
"Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker, 2008. "Too many cooks? Committees in monetary policy," Discussion Papers 2008/8, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2274, CESifo.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," KOF Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Nitsch, Volker & Berger, Helge, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 55742, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Helge Berger, 2006.
"Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB,"
The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
- Berger, Helge, 2005. "Optimal central bank design: benchmarks for the ECB," Discussion Papers 2005/27, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series 1697, CESifo.
- Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2007.
"On Committees of Experts,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372.
- Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "On Committees of Experts," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-028/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Farvaque, Etienne & Malan, Franck & Stanek, Piotr, 2020.
"Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
- Etienne Farvaque & Franck Malan & Piotr Stanek, 2020. "Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers," Post-Print hal-02502635, HAL.
- Christian Pierdzioch & Jan-Christoph Rülke & Peter Tillmann, 2013. "Using forecasts to uncover the loss function of FOMC members," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201302, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2013. "Dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 223-244, October.
More about this item
Keywords
Central bank; Inflation bias; Common agency; E52; E58;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:137:y:2008:i:1:p:197-206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.