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Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences

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  • Johnson, Eric D.
  • Ellis, Michael A.
  • Kotenko, Diana

Abstract

We document a behavioral idiosyncrasy in which Federal Reserve Bank presidents prefer tighter monetary policy at the end of their tenures. This suggests that consensus building on the Federal Open Market Committee occurs by moderating the policy preferences expressed by the presidents, rather than convincing them the consensus policy is superior.

Suggested Citation

  • Johnson, Eric D. & Ellis, Michael A. & Kotenko, Diana, 2012. "Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 368-371.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:368-371
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.045
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    2. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-441, November.
    3. William Greene, 2004. "The behaviour of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited dependent variable models in the presence of fixed effects," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 7(1), pages 98-119, June.
    4. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2008. "Leadership in Groups: A Monetary Policy Experiment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(4), pages 117-150, December.
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    6. Alan S. Blinder, 2009. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 171-194, August.
    7. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
    8. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jung, Alexander & Latsos, Sophia, 2015. "Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 173-183.
    2. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    3. Farvaque, Etienne & Malan, Franck & Stanek, Piotr, 2020. "Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    4. Carlos Carvalho & Tiago Fl´orido & Eduardo Zilberman, "undated". "Transitions in Central Bank Leadership," Textos para discussão 657, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    5. Hamza Bennani & Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek, 2015. "FOMC members’ incentives to disagree: regional motives and background influences," NBP Working Papers 221, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    6. Bennani, Hamza & Farvaque, Etienne & Stanek, Piotr, 2018. "Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 416-424.
    7. Ellis, Michael A. & Liu, Dandan, 2013. "Do FOMC forecasts add value to staff forecasts?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 332-340.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banking; Monetary policy; Committee decisions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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