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The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence

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  • Andreas Freytag

Abstract

The history of monetary policy is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross-sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem. It is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation rate. The exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment, the constraining influence of institutions and a new variable for ex-ante credibility of the reform. The paper allows for the conclusion that monetary commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Freytag, 2005. "The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 391-409, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:391-409
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2055-1
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    1. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:129:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Belke, Ansgar & Freytag, Andreas & Keil, Jonas & Schneider, Friedrich, 2014. "The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 217-227.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Are Monetary Rules and Reforms Complements or Substitutes? A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Working Papers 129, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    4. Andreas Freytag & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-002, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Belke, Ansgar H. & Herz, Bernhard & Vogel, Lukas, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 1798, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Ansgar Belke & Andreas Freytag & Jonas Keil & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements – Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s," Ruhr Economic Papers 0355, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 317-342, December.
    8. repec:zbw:rwirep:0355 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Beyond Trade – Is Reform Effort Affected by the Exchange Rate Regime? A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 107, pages 29-58.

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