Why Have Some Monetary Reforms Succeeded and Others Not? - An Empirical Assessment
AbstractMonetary history is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross--sectional exonometric analysis is schosen to deal wht this problem. It is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation rate. the exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment and the constraining influence of institutions. The paper allows for the conclusion that monetray commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Economic Policy, Cologne, Germany in its series IWP Discussion Paper Series with number 04/2001.
Date of creation: Apr 2001
Date of revision:
Monetary Reforms; Credibility; Commitment; Institutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
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