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Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote

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  • Nicolaus Tideman
  • Daniel Richardson

Abstract

The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is an attractive way of achieving representation that is proportional in terms of whatever characteristics of candidates voters value. Increasingly sophisticated methods of implementing STV have been advanced to overcome identified limitations of earlier methods. But every refinement comes at a cost of increased difficulty of understanding the vote-counting algorithm and increased cost of undertaking the count. This paper uses votes from actual elections to provide evidence about the frequency with which the choice of a particular STV method affects the outcome, and about the type of difference that different methods make. The most sophisticated STV method is CPO-STV, the comparison of pairs of outcomes by STV. This method avoids sequential exclusions and therefore overcomes the limitations of previous methods, that a paucity of votes in the early stages of a count can lead to the exclusion of a candidate who is the consensus choice of voters whose preferred candidates will be excluded at later stages of the count. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolaus Tideman & Daniel Richardson, 2000. "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 13-34, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:1:p:13-34
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005082925477
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicolaus Tideman, 1995. "The Single Transferable Vote," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 27-38, Winter.
    2. I. D. Hill, 1988. "Some Aspects of Elections — to Fill One Seat or Many," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 151(2), pages 243-261, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
    2. Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
    3. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
    4. Aziz, Haris & Lee, Barton E., 2022. "A characterization of proportionally representative committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 248-255.
    5. Nicolaus Tideman, 2015. "Multiple-winner voting rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 17, pages 303-324, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection," Working Papers hal-03880064, HAL.
    7. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 844, The University of Melbourne.
    8. Kamesh Munagala & Yiheng Shen & Kangning Wang & Zhiyi Wang, 2021. "Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing," Papers 2110.12499, arXiv.org.
    9. Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
    10. Dominik Peters & Grzegorz Pierczy'nski & Piotr Skowron, 2020. "Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities," Papers 2008.13276, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

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