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Voting by proxy

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  • Dan Alger

Abstract

I introduce voting by proxy for constructing and operating legislatures, and then compare it to direct representation, plurality, and single transferable vote (STV), which voting by proxy most closely resembles. When each voter uses voting by proxy to select his proxy among given legislators and elections are costless, voting by proxy maximizes the legislature's representation of the voting population. When each voter uses preferential voting by proxy, selecting a proxy during the vote count as well as a proxy in the legislature, and some ancillary rules are followed, I find that voting by proxy dominates STV and offers favorable tradeoffs against plurality. It improves representation and constituent service; eliminates gerrymandering; improves voter turnout; ranks the legislature's representatives by the proxies they hold rather than seniority; creates tighter representative-constituent links that lead to better informed voters, reducing the influence of special interests; and eliminates primary and runoff elections. Extra costs associated with its relative complexity or better representation can be made small. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Alger, 2006. "Voting by proxy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 1-26, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:126:y:2006:i:1:p:1-26
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-3059-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    2. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1991. "Monotonicity in Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 531-537, June.
    3. Monroe, Burt L., 1995. "Fully Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 925-940, December.
    4. Chamberlin, John R. & Courant, Paul N., 1983. "Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 718-733, September.
    5. Nicolaus Tideman, 1995. "The Single Transferable Vote," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 27-38, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Harrenstein & Marie-Louise Lackner & Martin Lackner, 2019. "A Mathematical Analysis of an Election System Proposed by Gottlob Frege," Papers 1907.03643, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    2. Jacqueline Harding, 2023. "Proxy Selection in Transitive Proxy Voting," Papers 2307.02627, arXiv.org.
    3. Reshef Meir & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2020. "Representative Committees of Peers," Papers 2006.07837, arXiv.org.
    4. Arnold Cédrick SOH VOUTSA, 2020. "Approval Voting & Majority Judgment in Weighted Representative Democracy," THEMA Working Papers 2020-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Jacqueline Harding, 2022. "Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 69-99, January.
    6. Pivato, Marcus & Soh, Arnold, 2020. "Weighted representative democracy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 52-63.
    7. James Green-Armytage, 2015. "Direct voting and proxy voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 190-220, June.
    8. Hans Gersbach, 2022. "New Forms of Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10134, CESifo.

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