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Voces populi and the art of listening

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  • Eivind Stensholt

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Abstract

The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles allowing this strategy. Theorems 2, 3, and 4 establish conditions for an anonymous and neutral 3-candidate single-seat election to be monotonic and still avoid this strategy completely. Plurality elections combine these properties; among the others "conditional IRV" gives the strongest challenge to the plurality winner. Conditional IRV is extended to any number of candidates. Theorem 5 is an impossibility of Gibbard-Satterthwaite type, describing 3 specific strategies that cannot all be avoided in meaningful anonymous and neutral elections.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 35 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 291-317

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:2:p:291-317

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  1. Rohini Pande, 2002. "Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India," Discussion Papers 0102-62, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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  4. Stensholt, E., 1992. "Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors," Papers 14-92, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  5. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July.
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  7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  8. Donald G. Saari, 2003. "Unsettling aspects of voting theory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 529-555, October.
  9. Michael Dummett, 1998. "The Borda count and agenda manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 289-296.
  10. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
  11. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.

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