Debt rescheduling and the choice between bonds and loans for LDCs' foreign debt
AbstractThis paper examines less developed country (LDC) borrowers' choice of financing methods. I devleop and test the hypothesis that ex-ante consideration of rescheduling affects LDC borrowers' choice between bonds and commercial loans. Banks can monitor and distinguish between permanent and temporary shocks, while bondholders cannot. Therefore, debt rescheduling based on the nature of economic shocks is feasible with loan financing. Our empirical findings indicate the debt rescheduling is considered exante in LDC lending. In addition, default risk and contract size affect the choice of financing instruments. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.
Volume (Year): 5 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323
bonds; loans; permanent shock; temporary shock; debt rescheduling/reduction;
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