Competitive bidding for Medicare Part B clinical laboratory services
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DOI: 10.1007/s10754-013-9139-0
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More about this item
Keywords
Clinical laboratory; Competitive bidding; Auction; Medicare; Part B; CLIA; Reimbursement; D44; H51; I11; I18; L88;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy
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