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Individual Transferable Quota Markets under Illegal Fishing


Author Info

  • Carlos Chavez


  • Hugo Salgado


The use of individual transferable quotas in fisheries has been considered an opportunity to achieve a given total allowable catch with a maximum social benefit. One of the assumptions used in obtaining that result is that the system is in perfect compliance. The presence of violations and the need for enforcement of tradable property rights systems in fisheries has not received much attention in the literature. The incidents of non-compliance, however, may affect the performance of transferable property rights-based fisheries in unexplored ways. In this paper, we adapt previous literature on enforcing emissions trading programs to analyze a positive model of fisherman behavior that operates under a perfectly competitive individual transferable quota system, while recognizing the opportunities for violations of quota holdings, given incomplete enforcement. Considering a poorly enforced, individual transferable quota system we are able to obtain a number of implications for the current and future equilibrium of the quota market, the time paths of the fishery, and the proper design of a policy rule on total allowable catch (TAC). Copyright Springer 2005

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Pages: 303-324

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:3:p:303-324

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Related research

Keywords: enforcement; illegal fishing; individual transferable quotas; quota markets; L51; Q22;

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Cited by:
  1. Alvear, Santiago A. Bermeo, 2006. "Modelling an ITQ Scheme in the Galapagos Marine Reserve Spiny Lobster Fishery," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31973, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  2. John K. Stranlund, 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Papers 2006-2, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  3. Rögnvaldur Hannesson, 2011. "When is fish quota enforcement worth while? A study of the Northeast Arctic cod," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 139-160, July.
  4. John K. Stranlund, 2006. "The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in Emissions Trading Programs," Working Papers 2006-7, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  5. Alvear, Santiago A. Bermeo, 2006. "Modelling an ITQ Scheme in the Galapagos Marine Reserve Spiny Lobster Fishery," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31973, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  6. Hatcher, Aaron, 2012. "Market power and compliance with output quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 255-269.
  7. Akpalu, Wisdom, 2011. "Determinants of noncompliance with light attraction regulation among inshore fishers in Ghana," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 172-177, April.
  8. James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2005. "A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement," Working Papers 2005-1, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  9. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 217-233, October.
  10. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.


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