Too big to fail: a thorn in the side of free markets
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.
Volume (Year): 38 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100261
Too big to fail; Financial sector; Implicit state guarantee; Size of firms; Economies of scale; Economies of scope; Too big to rescue; Switzerland; G18; G28; L51;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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11-37, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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- Hans-Werner Sinn, 2001. "Risk Taking, Limited Liability and the Competition of Bank Regulators," CESifo Working Paper Series 603, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2003. "Risktaking, Limited Liability, and the Competition of Bank Regulators," Munich Reprints in Economics 19615, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Chen Zhou, 2009. "Are banks too big to fail?," DNB Working Papers 232, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Frederic S. Mishkin, 2005. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail?," NBER Working Papers 11814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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