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Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth

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  • Justin Callais

    (Texas Tech University)

  • Andrew T. Young

    (Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University)

Abstract

Should procedural barriers to constitutional amendment be more onerous than those to the policy changes of ordinary politics? – i.e., should constitutions be entrenched? One criterion by which to evaluate these questions is economic performance. Using data on countries worldwide and constitutional adoptions from 1973 to 2017, we estimate the effect of constitutional entrenchment (rigidity) on economic growth. We employ matching methods to make causal inferences. The adoption of a constitution that is meaningfully more rigid than its predecessor defines a treatment. In our benchmark estimations (based on 19 treatments), post-treatment effects on growth are generally small and statistically insignificant. However, when we examine a subsample that excludes autocracies (13 treatments), post-treatment effects are always negative and sometimes statistically significant. The same is true when we exclude treatments associated with coups (12 treatments). Contrary to many scholars’ priors, the evidence suggests that, if anything (and based on the limited number of available treatments), greater entrenchment causes less economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2022. "Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-62, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:53:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-021-09715-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-021-09715-4
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    Cited by:

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    2. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutions; Entrenchment; Constitutional rigidity; Constitutional amendments; Political economy; Matching methods; Economic growth; Economic development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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