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Loss of control: legislature changes and the state–local relationship

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  • Jessica Hennessey

Abstract

There are a variety of methods that state legislatures can use to pass legislation which relates to municipalities. This paper explores why, how and when states changed their constitutions from allowing special legislation for municipalities to requiring general laws which would apply to all municipalities. Historians have put forward several explanations for why special legislation was harder to maintain as the nineteenth century progressed. A new way of framing the story is presented here by considering how the passage of special legislation was maintained through a logroll; legislators formed a coalition to vote on each other’s local legislation. As the size of the legislature expanded and the composition of the legislature changed, it may have been harder for legislators to maintain a coalition in order to logroll each other’s proposed local legislation. The previous theories along with the new one presented here are empirically tested. Evidence suggests a link between the size of the state legislature and the probability of instituting general legislation for municipalities, indicating that one motivation for adopting general laws was the dissolution of a stable logroll. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Jessica Hennessey, 2014. "Loss of control: legislature changes and the state–local relationship," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 407-433, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:25:y:2014:i:4:p:407-433
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9174-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 645-685, September.
    3. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro & Michael Sinkinson, 2011. "The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2980-3018, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Logroll; Special legislation; General legislation; Constitutional change; Apportionment; D72; H7; N4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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