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Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation

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  • Andreas Million
  • Regina T. Riphahn
  • Achim Wambach

Abstract

This paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand. First, it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting, to permit the efficient estimation of this type of model with panel data. Second, it provides an innovative test of adverse selection and confirms that high-risk individuals are more likely to acquire supplemental add-on insurance. Third, the estimations yield that in accordance with the theory of moral hazard, we observe a much lower frequency of doctor visits among the self-employed, and among mothers of small children. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Million & Regina T. Riphahn & Achim Wambach, 2003. "Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(4), pages 387-405.
  • Handle: RePEc:jae:japmet:v:18:y:2003:i:4:p:387-405
    DOI: 10.1002/jae.680
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    References listed on IDEAS

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