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Adverse Selection and Adverse Retention

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  • Altman, Daniel
  • Cutler, David M
  • Zeckhauser, Richard J

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 88 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 122-26

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:2:p:122-26

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Geruso & Harvey S. Rosen, 2013. "Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program," NBER Working Papers 18947, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. David Bardey & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2009. "Competition among health plans: a two-sided market approach," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 005217, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  3. Karen Eggleston & Randall P. Ellis & Mingshan Lu, 2007. "Prevention and Dynamic Risk Adjustment," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-023, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  4. Jeonghoon Ahn, 2004. "Panel Data Sample Selection Model: an Application to Employee Choice of Health Plan Type and Medical Cost Estimation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 560, Econometric Society.
  5. Wendy Edelberg, 2004. "Testing for adverse selection and moral hazard in consumer loan markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. Shmueli, Amir, 2011. "Switching sickness funds in Israel: Adverse selection or risk selection? Some insights from the analysis of the relative costs of switchers," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 247-254.
  7. Ronald Eduardo Gómez Suárez, 2007. "Cream-Skimming And Risk Adjustment in Colombian Health Insurance System:: The Public Insurer Case," ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMÍA 004295, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN.
  8. Andreas Million & Regina T. Riphahn & Achim Wambach, 2003. "Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(4), pages 387-405.
  9. Rudy Douven, 2004. "Risk adjustment in the Netherlands; an analysis of insurers' health care expenditures," CPB Discussion Paper 39, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  10. Michael Geruso & Harvey S. Rosen, 2013. "Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program," Working Papers 1449, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  11. Daniel Altman & David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, 2000. "Enrollee Mix, Treatment Intensity, and Cost in Competing Indemnity and HMO Plans," NBER Working Papers 7832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Lehmann, Hansjorg & Zweifel, Peter, 2004. "Innovation and risk selection in deregulated social health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 997-1012, September.
  13. Harold Black & Thomas Boehm & Ramon DeGennaro, 2004. "Is discretionary pricing discretionary?: The case of overages in mortgage lending," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 59-68, June.
  14. Karen Eggleston & Anupa Bir, 2009. "Measuring Selection Incentives in Managed Care: Evidence From the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 159-175.
  15. Herring, Bradley & Pauly, Mark V., 2006. "Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 395-417, May.
  16. Strombom, Bruce A. & Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Feldstein, Paul J., 2002. "Switching costs, price sensitivity and health plan choice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 89-116, January.
  17. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Fiebig, Denzil G. & Jones, Glenn & Savage, Elizabeth, 2013. "Preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance: The case of Australia," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 757-767.
  18. Keith J. Crocker & John R. Moran, 2002. "Contracting with Limited Commitment: Evidence from Employment-Based Health Insurance Contracts," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 45, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
  19. Baicker, Katherine & Chernew, Michael E. & Robbins, Jacob A., 2013. "The spillover effects of Medicare managed care: Medicare Advantage and hospital utilization," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1289-1300.
  20. repec:clg:wpaper:2007-06 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Lu Ji & Fei Liu, 2007. "HMO versus non-HMO private managed care plans: an investigation on pre-switch consumption," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 67-80, February.

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