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Empirical Evidence Of The Influences On First-Price Bid Auction Premiums

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Author Info

  • Abdul ?Rasheed Amidu

    ()
    (Birmingham City University)

  • Alirat Olayinka Agboola

    ()
    (Obafemi Awolowo University)

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    Abstract

    This study examines the determinants of auction premium using data from a first-price sealed bid auction of Federal Government Landed Properties in Nigeria. The results indicate that the number of bidders and location are important determinants of auction price premiums. These findings are consistent with the auction theory. The empirical estimates also suggest that property type as well as bidder characteristics may also influence auction premiums.

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    File URL: http://www.umac.mo/fba/irer/papers/past/vol12n2_pdf/04.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Asian Real Estate Society in its journal International Real Estate Review.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 157-170

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    Handle: RePEc:ire:issued:v:12:n:02:2009:p:157-170

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Asia Real Estate Society, 51 Monroe Street, Plaza E-6, Rockville, MD 20850, USA
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    Web page: http://www.asres.org/

    Order Information:
    Postal: Asian Real Estate Society, 51 Monroe Street, Plaza E-6, Rockville, MD 20850, USA
    Email:
    Web: http://www.asres.org/

    Related research

    Keywords: Real estate markets; First-price bid auction; Auction price premium; Nigeria;

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    References

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    1. Joseph T.L. Ooi & C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2006. "Price Formation Under Small Numbers Competition: Evidence from Land Auctions in Singapore," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 34(1), pages 51-76, 03.
    2. Kenneth M. Lusht, 1996. "A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private Negotiations," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 24(4), pages 517-530.
    3. Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-05, May.
    4. Saidi, Reza & Marsden, James R., 1992. "Number of bids, number of bidders and bidding behavior in outer-continental shelf oil lease auction markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 335-343, May.
    5. Christopher J. Mayer, 1998. "Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 41-66.
    6. John P. Harding & John R. Knight & C.F. Sirmans, 2003. "Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 601-622, December.
    7. John P. Harding & Stuart S. Rosenthal & C. F. Sirmans, 2003. "Estimating Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 178-188, February.
    8. Ching, Stephen & Fu, Yuming, 2003. "Contestability of the urban land market: an event study of Hong Kong land auctions," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 695-720, October.
    9. Seow Eng Ong & Kenneth Lusht & Chee Yong Mak, 2005. "Factors Influencing Auction Outcomes: Bidder Turnout, Auction Houses and Market Conditions," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 27(2), pages 177-192.
    10. Mayer Christopher J., 1995. "A Model of Negotiated Sales Applied to Real Estate Auctions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-22, July.
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    Cited by:
    1. Rosane Hungria-Gunnelin, 2013. "Impact of Number of Bidders on Sale Price of Auctioned Condominium Apartments in Stockholm," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 16(3), pages 274-295.

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