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Yes, “Bait and Switch” Really Benefits Consumers

Author

Listed:
  • James D. Hess

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820)

  • Eitan Gerstner

    (Graduate School of Management, University of California–Davis, Davis, California 95616)

Abstract

In our 1990 paper we demonstrated that a law prohibiting bait and switch may have the surprising consequence of hurting the consumers it was designed to protect. Wilkie, Mela, and Gundlach (1998) postulate that this may be false if upselling is equally effective when the bait brand is available and when it is out of stock. We show here that our earlier conclusion is correct in a more general setting: A law prohibiting bait and switch in a competitive market can reduce consumer well-being but never improve it. When bait and switch occurs, it creates welfare gains, and when it would create welfare losses, it does not occur, regardless of a law prohibiting the practice.

Suggested Citation

  • James D. Hess & Eitan Gerstner, 1998. "Yes, “Bait and Switch” Really Benefits Consumers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 283-289.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:17:y:1998:i:3:p:283-289
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.17.3.283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William L. Wilkie & Carl F. Mela & Gregory T. Gundlach, 1998. "Does “Bait and Switch” Really Benefit Consumers?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 273-282.
    2. Eitan Gerstner & James D. Hess, 1990. "Can Bait and Switch Benefit Consumers?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(2), pages 114-124.
    3. William L. Wilkie & Carl F. Mela & Gregory T. Gundlach, 1998. "Does “Bait and Switch” Really Benefit Consumers? Advancing the Discussion …," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 290-293.
    4. James D. Hess & Eitan Gerstner, 1987. "Loss Leader Pricing and Rain Check Policy," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(4), pages 358-374.
    5. Subramanian Balachander & Peter H. Farquhar, 1994. "Gaining More by Stocking Less: A Competitive Analysis of Product Availability," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(1), pages 3-22.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiang, Wei-yu Kevin, 2010. "Product availability in competitive and cooperative dual-channel distribution with stock-out based substitution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 200(1), pages 111-126, January.
    2. William L. Wilkie & Carl F. Mela & Gregory T. Gundlach, 1998. "Does “Bait and Switch” Really Benefit Consumers? Advancing the Discussion …," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 290-293.
    3. Matthew Jones & Bruce Kobayashi & Jason O’Connor, 2018. "Economics at the FTC: Non-price Merger Effects and Deceptive Automobile Ads," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(4), pages 593-614, December.
    4. Eitan Gerstner & Barak Libai, 2006. "—Why Does Poor Service Prevail?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 601-603, 11-12.

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