"The article explores the question of how the German wage agreement system influences the works councils’ effects on company efficiency and on the company wage level. On the one hand, an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical research is provided. On the other hand, new empirical estimates are presented that are theoretically underpinned by a simple bargaining model. All in all, the findings in this paper indicate that the works councils are more active in generating company-specific pensions and less in distributing them if a company is obliged to pay in line with wage agreements. This is also true for medium-sized companies." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Tiroley, Jean, 2000.
"Corporate Governance,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2000-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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