Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its journal Economic Quarterly.

Volume (Year): (2007)
Issue (Month): Win ()
Pages: 77-109
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2007:i:win:p:77-109:n:v.93no.1

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.richmondfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research

Keywords: Taxation;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Lacker, J.M., 1989. "Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 956, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-63, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Schroyen, Fred, 1997. "Pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 343-366, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Lacker, Jeffrey M. & Levy, Robert J. & Weinberg, John A., 1990. "Incentive compatible financial contracts, asset prices, and the value of control," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 31-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.