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A Simultaneous Descending Bid Auction for Multiple Items and Unitary Demand

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  • Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simultaneous Descending Bid Auction for Multiple Items and Unitary Demand," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 56(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:56:y:2002:i:3:a:822
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    1. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-450, March.
    2. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-888, July.
    3. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1982. "The central assignment game and the assignment markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2-3), pages 205-232, September.
    4. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 1990. "The core of the matching game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 203-212, September.
    5. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
    6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    7. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-479, June.
    8. Kaneko, Mamoru & Yamamoto, Yoshitsugu, 1986. "The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 118-136, February.
    9. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    10. Ahmet Alkan, 1992. "Equilibrium in a Matching Market with General Preferences," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mukul Majumdar (ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics, chapter 1, pages 1-16, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
    12. Marilda Sotomayor, 1999. "The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 567-583.
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    1. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 99-119, June.
    2. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
    3. Eduard Alonso-Paulí & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2012. "Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 113-141, January.
    4. Mishra, Debasis & Talman, Dolf, 2010. "Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 6-20, January.
    5. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 155-174, May.
    6. Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2018. "Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints," Discussion Papers 18/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2005. "A Dynamic Market Clearing Price Mechanism with Multiple Demands," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 25(2), November.
    8. Mishra, D. & Talman, A.J.J., 2006. "Overdemand and Underdemand in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Unit Demands," Discussion Paper 2006-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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