Public Utilities: Privatization without Regulation
AbstractIn the last decades, transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe have engaged in strong privatization programs of public utilities. However, a large part of them did not meet legal and economic conditions needed for a market economy to take place. In this paper, we study how a firm producing a public utility and moving from a public ownership to privatization and thus adopting a profit-maximizing criterion defines its production plans, when an appropriate regulatory environment is still lacking.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 4 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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