Hypothetical and Real Incentives in the Ultimatum Game and Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study
AbstractIn economics experiments, the use of hypothetical incentives is generally restricted to classroom examples; however hypothetical incentives have a clear cost-saving appeal. Although some published experiments have been conducted under the assumption that people act in the same manner with hypothetical incentives as with real ones, it is generally assumed that only real incentives generate economic behavior. Comparing hypothetical to real incentives, we find that in the Ultimatum Game hypothetical incentives do not consistently provide the same results as real incentives; in Andreoni’s Public Goods Game hypothetical incentives produce results that are statistically indistinguishable from those seen with real incentives.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 33 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998.
"Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
344, David K. Levine.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Glenn W. Harrison & Eric Johnson & Melayne M. McInnes & E. Elisabet Rutstr�m, 2005. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 897-901, June.
- Sefton, Martin, 1992. "Incentives in simple bargaining games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 263-276, June.
- Bolle, Friedel, 1990. "High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 157-167, June.
- Blumenschein, Karen & Johannesson, Magnus & Blomquist, Glenn C. & Liljas, Bengt & O'Conor, Richard M., 1997. "Hypothetical versus real payments in Vickrey auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 177-180, October.
- Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
- repec:att:wimass:9006 is not listed on IDEAS
- Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999.
"The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
- Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Working Papers 1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
- Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
- Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
- Andreoni, James, 1993.
"An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-27, December.
- repec:pri:indrel:724 is not listed on IDEAS
- Zack Devlin-Foltz & Katherine Lim, 2008. "Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 505-518, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.