This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Hypothetical and Real Incentives in the Ultimatum Game and Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mark T. Gillis (West Virginia University)
Paul L. Hettler () (California University of Pennsylvania)
Abstract

In economics experiments, the use of hypothetical incentives is generally restricted to classroom examples; however hypothetical incentives have a clear cost-saving appeal. Although some published experiments have been conducted under the assumption that people act in the same manner with hypothetical incentives as with real ones, it is generally assumed that only real incentives generate economic behavior. Comparing hypothetical to real incentives, we find that in the Ultimatum Game hypothetical incentives do not consistently provide the same results as real incentives; in Andreoni’s Public Goods Game hypothetical incentives produce results that are statistically indistinguishable from those seen with real incentives.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://college.holycross.edu/eej/Volume33/V33N4P491_510.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 33 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 491-510
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:33:y:2007:i:4:p:491-510

Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Iona College, 715 North Avenue, New Rochelle, New York 10801-1890 USA
Phone: (914) 633-2088
Fax: (914) 633-2549
Email:
Web page: http://www.iona.edu/eea/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Dr. Mary H. Lesser, Department of Economics, Iona College, New Rochelle, NY 10801-1890
Email:
Web: http://www.iona.edu/eea/publications/subandmem.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lisa Cameron, 1995. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia," Working Papers 724, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Working Papers 1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Glenn W. Harrison & Eric Johnson & Melayne M. McInnes & E. Elisabet Rutstrom, 2005. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 897-901, June. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sefton, Martin, 1992. "Incentives in simple bargaining games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 263-276, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
  9. Blumenschein, Karen & Johannesson, Magnus & Blomquist, Glenn C. & Liljas, Bengt & O'Conor, Richard M., 1997. "Hypothetical versus real payments in Vickrey auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 177-180, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bolle, Friedel, 1990. "High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 157-167, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Andreoni, James, 1993. "An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-27, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Zack Devlin-Foltz & Katherine Lim, 2008. "Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 505-518, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.