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The good, the bad, and the ugly: Technology transfer competence, rent-seeking, and bargaining power

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  • Ciabuschi, Francesco
  • Dellestrand, Henrik
  • Kappen, Philip
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    Abstract

    In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of World Business.

    Volume (Year): 47 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 664-674

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:worbus:v:47:y:2012:i:4:p:664-674

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    Related research

    Keywords: Bargaining power; Competition and cooperation; Multinational corporation; Rent-seeking; Technology transfer;

    References

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    Cited by:
    1. Mudambi, Ram & Pedersen, Torben & Andersson, Ulf, 2014. "How subsidiaries gain power in multinational corporations," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 101-113.
    2. Najafi-Tavani, Zhaleh & Giroud, Axèle & Andersson, Ulf, 2014. "The interplay of networking activities and internal knowledge actions for subsidiary influence within MNCs," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 122-131.

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