Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji
AbstractExtensive previous work has analyzed the functioning of collective ownership institutions, arguing that such institutions can better govern common pool resources under some conditions than private or state ownership. However, empirical research regarding the impact of stronger collective ownership rights on household welfare is limited. Exploiting a natural experiment, this article uses a unique dataset to examine the impact of collective fisheries ownership on household income and food consumption in Fiji. Strengthening collective ownership rights improves household welfare as indicated by food consumption, but does not increase monetary income. Income improvements are instead attributable to Nongovernmental organization (NGO) project support.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.
Volume (Year): 43 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
property rights; economic development; institutions; common pool resources; collective; ownership; Fiji;
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