IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v38y1995i2p393-436.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law

Author

Listed:
  • Lueck, Dean

Abstract

Economists have shown that first possession might cause rent dissipation from racing or overexploitation. In this study, I develop models that show how dissipation can be avoided and use the derived implications to explain the observed pattern of first possession rules in a variety of legal fields. The analysis hinges on the recognition that possession may extend to either the entire stock of a resource of simply a onetime flow from that stock. Not only do the paths of rent dissipation depend on this distinction, but so do the predicted responses of the law. When first possession has the potential for a race, the law tends to mitigate dissipation by assigning possession when differences between claimants are greatest. Alternatively, when first possession leads to overexploitation through a rule of capture, the law tends to limit access and restrict the transfer of access rights in order to limit open access dissipation. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Lueck, Dean, 1995. "The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 393-436, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:2:p:393-436
    DOI: 10.1086/467337
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467337
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/467337?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Netter, Jeffry M. & Hersch, Philip L. & Manson, Willam D., 1986. "An economic analysis of adverse possession statutes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 217-228, December.
    2. Richard A. Easterlin, 1992. "Analysis," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(4), pages 51-53, July.
    3. Umbeck, John, 1977. "A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 421-437, October.
    4. Rubin, Paul H & Bailey, Martin J, 1994. "The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 807-831, June.
    5. Ellickson, Robert C, 1989. "A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 83-97, Spring.
    6. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-979, December.
    7. Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-468, October.
    8. Rose, Carol M, 1990. "Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 261-296, June.
    9. Kitch, Edmund W, 1977. "The Nature and Function of the Patent System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 265-290, October.
    10. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-179, April.
    12. Allen, Douglas W, 1991. "Homesteading and Property Rights; or, "How the West Was Really Won."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-23, April.
    13. Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September.
    14. Christopher Harris & John Vickers, 1985. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(2), pages 193-209.
    15. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
    16. McFetridge, Donald G & Smith, Douglas A, 1980. "Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 197-203, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Libecap, Gary D., 2007. "The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 257-291, June.
    2. Bryan Leonard & Gary D. Libecap, 2016. "Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the Development of Irrigation in the Western United States," NBER Working Papers 22185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
      • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Edwards, Steven F., 2003. "Property rights to multi-attribute fishery resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2-3), pages 309-323, March.
    5. Koo, Bonwoo & Wright, Brian D., 2002. "Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity," EPTD discussion papers 88, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    6. Anderson, C. Leigh & Swimmer, Eugene, 1997. "Some empirical evidence on property rights of first peoples," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, May.
    7. Smith, Steven M., 2021. "The relative economic merits of alternative water right systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    8. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    9. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    10. Clay, Karen & Wright, Gavin, 2005. "Order without law? Property rights during the California gold rush," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 155-183, April.
    11. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism," NBER Working Papers 24544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Brown Matthew & Cardiff-Hicks Brianna, 2018. "The Tragedy of the Uncommons," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-22, July.
    13. Gerard, David, 1998. "The development of first-possession rules in US mining, 1872-1920: theory, evidence, and policy implications," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 251-264, December.
    14. Benjamin Klein & Roy W. Kenney, 1985. "Contractual Flexibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 388, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Meina Cai & Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili & Raufhon Salahodjaev, 2020. "Individualism and governance of the commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 175-195, July.
    16. Edwards, Griffin & Robinson, Joshua J., 2019. "You gotta fight for your right? Publicly assigned but privately enforced property rights," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 31-39.
    17. Bhattacharya, Haimanti & Lueck, Dean, 2009. "The role of property rights in determining the environmental quality-income relationship," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(10), pages 2511-2524, August.
    18. Lawson-Remer, Terra, 2013. "Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 207-225.
    19. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    20. Wright, Brian D. & Pardey, Philip G. & Nottenburg, Carol & Koo, Bonwoo, 2007. "Agricultural Innovation: Investments and Incentives," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: Robert Evenson & Prabhu Pingali (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 48, pages 2533-2603, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:2:p:393-436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.