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The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law

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Author Info
Lueck, Dean

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Abstract

Economists have shown that first possession might cause rent dissipation from racing or overexploitation. In this study, I develop models that show how dissipation can be avoided and use the derived implications to explain the observed pattern of first possession rules in a variety of legal fields. The analysis hinges on the recognition that possession may extend to either the entire stock of a resource of simply a onetime flow from that stock. Not only do the paths of rent dissipation depend on this distinction, but so do the predicted responses of the law. When first possession has the potential for a race, the law tends to mitigate dissipation by assigning possession when differences between claimants are greatest. Alternatively, when first possession leads to overexploitation through a rule of capture, the law tends to limit access and restrict the transfer of access rights in order to limit open access dissipation. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 393-436
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:2:p:393-436

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  1. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2009. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Institutions," NBER Working Papers 14942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Murky Waters: The Law and Economics of Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks," Working papers 2004-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Libecap, Gary D., 2007. "Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool: Implications of the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules for ITQs in Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 22(4). [Downloadable!]
  4. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2009. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Institutions," ICER Working Papers 14-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gary D. Libecap & Terry L. Anderson, 2009. "The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform," ICER Working Papers 13-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi, 2009. "Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 171-196, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. repec:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:10 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gary D. Libecap & R. Quentin Grafton & Clay Landry & J.R. O’Brien, 2009. "Markets - Water Markets: Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin and the US Southwest," ICER Working Papers 15-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kurt Annen, 2006. "Property Rights Assignment: Conflict and the Implementability of Rules," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 155-166, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2005. "Appropriating Economic Rents from Resources: An Integrative Property Rights and Resource-Based Approach," Working Papers 05-0123, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gary Libecap, 2007. "Regulation and Deregulation: Property Rights Allocation Issues in De Regulation of Common Pool Resources," ICER Working Papers 28-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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