Industry Factors and the Changing Dynamics of the Player-Agent Relationship in Professional Ice Hockey
AbstractPlayer agents are now long-established and influential stakeholders in the business of professional ice hockey in North America. With the help of agents, average National Hockey League (NHL) player salaries have grown from US$24,000 in 1972 to an average of US$1.49 million annually in the 2000/2001 season. Since the arrival of agents in the mid-1960s, the professional hockey industry has experienced significant and turbulent growth. This paper identifies and reviews the industry changes that have taken place in hockey in recent decades and the manner in which these factors have affected the relationship between player and agent. Principal-agent theory is used to facilitate an analysis of the contracts and relationships between professional hockey players and sports agents and to understand the effects of changing environmental pressures upon these relationships.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Sport Management Review.
Volume (Year): 4 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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