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The determinants of director remuneration, executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms

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  • Hearn, Bruce
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    Abstract

    This paper examines the impact of board governance mechanisms, namely board size, independence ratio, opacity of earnings disclosure, and ratio of genuinely independent nonexecutive directors to total board size on director remuneration, executive tenure and likelihood of individual executive salary disclosure in a unique and comprehensive sample of 69 North African IPO firms. I find evidence of the enhanced governance role of true independent nonexecutives in family as opposed to non-family firms in improving disclosure of individual salaries and moderating lengths of executive tenure. However while their role is only significant in the context of family firms the evidence suggests that their presence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. The evidence also ascribes a greater role for business angel as opposed to more formal private equity financing which is more applicable within the highly social networked economy of the Maghreb region.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in International Business and Finance.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 162-182

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:27:y:2013:i:1:p:162-182

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ribaf

    Related research

    Keywords: IPO; Board of directors; Remuneration; Institutional theory;

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