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The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings

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Author Info

  • Alon Brav
  • Paul A. Gompers

Abstract

In a sample of 2,794 initial public offerings (IPOs), we test three potential explanations for the existence of IPO lockups: lockups serve as (i) a signal of firm quality, (ii) a commitment device to alleviate moral hazard problems, or (iii) a mechanism for underwriters to extract additional compensation from the issuing firm. Our results support the commitment hypothesis. Insiders of firms that are associated with greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer period of time. Insiders of firms that have experienced larger excess returns, are backed by venture capitalists, or go public with high-quality underwriters are more likely to be released from the lockup restrictions. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 16 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-29

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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:16:y:2003:i:1:p:1-29

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Cited by:
  1. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc & Khurshed, Arif, 2006. "Explaining the diversity in shareholder lockup agreements," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 254-280, April.
  2. Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T. & Puri, M.L., 2011. "A Survey of Venture Capital Research," Discussion Paper 2011-044, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  3. Branko Urosevic, 2001. "Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes," Economics Working Papers 787, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004.
  4. Kennedy, Duane B. & Sivakumar, Ranjini & Vetzal, Kenneth R., 2006. "The implications of IPO underpricing for the firm and insiders: Tests of asymmetric information theories," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 49-78, January.
  5. Angenandt, P.P. & Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry," Discussion Paper 2005-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Harrison Hong & José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2006. "Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1073-1117, 06.
  7. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2006. "Hedge markets for executives and corporate agency," CORE Discussion Papers 2006009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Wolfgang Bessler & Andreas Kurth, 2007. "Agency Problems and the Performance of Venture-backed IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies, Lock-up Periods, and Bank Ownership," European Journal of Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 29-63.
  9. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Wen-Chung Guo, 2010. "Divergence of opinion and initial public offerings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 59-79, January.
  10. Arthurs, Jonathan D. & Busenitz, Lowell W. & Hoskisson, Robert E. & Johnson, Richard A., 2009. "Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of the lockup period," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 360-372, July.
  11. Betzer, André & Doumet, Markus & Rinne, Ulf, 2011. "How Policy Changes Affect Shareholder Wealth: The Case of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster," IZA Discussion Papers 5896, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Aggarwal, Reena & Klapper, Leora, 2003. "Ownership structure and initial public offerings," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3103, The World Bank.
  13. Cumming, Douglas & Johan, Sofia Atiqah binti, 2008. "Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1209-1241, October.
  14. Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Khurshed, A., 2004. "Shareholder Lockup Agreements in the European New Markets," Discussion Paper 2004-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Yung, Chris & Zender, Jaime F., 2010. "Moral hazard, asymmetric information and IPO lockups," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 320-332, June.
  16. Steven Zheng & Joseph Ogden & Frank Jen, 2005. "Pursuing Value Through Liquidity in IPOs: Underpricing, Share Retention, Lockup, and Trading Volume Relationships," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 293-312, November.
  17. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Robert Fok & Chiuling Lu, 2011. "An Analysis of Lockups in REIT IPOs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 359-384, October.
  18. Lee, Gemma & Masulis, Ronald W., 2009. "Seasoned equity offerings: Quality of accounting information and expected flotation costs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 443-469, June.
  19. Trauten, Andreas & Schulz, Roland C., 2006. "IPO investment strategies and pseudo market timing," Working Papers 36, Competence Center Internet Economy and Hybrid Systems, European Research Center for Information Systems (ERCIS), University of Münster.

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