Consumer welfare, licensing, and exclusive dealing with vertically- and horizontally-differentiated products
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DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2022.02.035
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More about this item
Keywords
Exclusive dealing; Two-part tariffs; Licensing; Multi-input multi-product firm; Vertically-and horizontally-differentiated products;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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