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Financing constraints and the cost of equity: Evidence on the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder

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  • Luo, Qi
  • Li, Hui
  • Zhang, Biao

Abstract

This study examines the financial consequences of the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies during the 2003–2009 period, we find that companies characterized by a wider divergence between the controlling shareholder's control and cash flow rights have a significantly higher cash flow sensitivity of cash. This result is consistent with the argument that the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders induces financing constraints. We also find that the divergence of the control and cash flow rights increases the cost of equity, suggesting that minority shareholders take into account the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder and demand higher risk premium. Our results imply that the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder prevents a firm from funding all its desired investments and that minority shareholders discount the terms at which they are willing to provide financing.

Suggested Citation

  • Luo, Qi & Li, Hui & Zhang, Biao, 2015. "Financing constraints and the cost of equity: Evidence on the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 99-106.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:36:y:2015:i:c:p:99-106
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2014.11.010
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Controlling shareholder; Financing constraints; Cost of equity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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