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Excess Control, Corporate Governance and Implied Cost of Equity: International Evidence

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  • Omrane Guedhami
  • Dev Mishra

Abstract

We investigate whether the separation between ownership and control rights can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of capital-raising costs. Using estimates of the cost of equity capital implied by analyst earnings forecasts and growth rate for a sample of 1,207 firms from nine Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find strong, robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in excess control, while controlling for other firm-level characteristics. This core finding persists after controlling for legal institutions variables. Copyright (c) 2009, The Eastern Finance Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Eastern Finance Association in its journal Financial Review.

Volume (Year): 44 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 489-524

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Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:44:y:2009:i:4:p:489-524

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Web page: http://www.easternfinance.org/
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Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0732-8516

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Cited by:
  1. Sabri Boubaker & Hind Sami, 2011. "Multiple large shareholders and earnings informativeness," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 10(3), pages 246-266, August.
  2. Belot, François, 2010. "Excess control rights and corporate acquisitions," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5922, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Najah Attig & Sadok El Ghoul & Omrane Guedhami & Sorin Rizeanu, 2013. "The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 419-451, May.
  4. Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Rouatbi, Wael, 2013. "Excess control, agency costs and the probability of going private in France," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 250-265.
  5. Aggarwal, Raj & Goodell, John W., 2008. "Equity premia in emerging markets: National characteristics as determinants," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 389-404, October.
  6. Boubakri, Narjess & Guedhami, Omrane & Mishra, Dev & Saffar, Walid, 2012. "Political connections and the cost of equity capital," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 541-559.
  7. Kien Cao & Jeff Madura, 2011. "Determinants of the Method of Payment in Asset Sell‐Off Transactions," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 643-670, November.
  8. Norio Kitagawa & Masatoshi Gotoh, 2011. "Implied Cost of Capital over the Last 20 Years," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 1, pages 71-104, December.
  9. Boubaker, Sabri & Nguyen, Pascal & Rouatbi, Wael, 2012. "Large shareholders and firm risk-taking behavior," MPRA Paper 39005, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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