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Overcoming inefficiencies in patent licensing: A method to assess patent essentiality for technical standards

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  • Bekkers, Rudi
  • Tur, Elena M.
  • Henkel, Joachim
  • van der Vorst, Tommy
  • Driesse, Menno
  • Contreras, Jorge L.

Abstract

The market for patent licenses, despite its paramount importance for technological innovation, has various inefficiencies. A particular problem with widely used technical standards such as LTE and Wi-Fi is the lack of information regarding which patents are “essential” to implement the standard. This information is crucial because it simplifies determining infringement and implies specific “FRAND” licensing rules. While many standards-developing organizations stipulate that such patents are explicitly declared, little is known about which are actually essential. The absence of publicly available information on essentiality incurs significant social costs due to the resulting friction in the licensing market. With the growing use and importance of standards to mobility and energy markets, and to the Internet of Things, these costs are likely to rise. Responding to calls from industry, courts and policymakers, commercial and academic studies have attempted to assess essentiality, but they all have limitations. This paper reports on the technical feasibility of a system of expert assessments for patent essentiality. Based on a factorial design, we conducted a field experiment with 20 patent examiners performing over 100 assessments. Comparing the outcomes to a high-quality reference point shows that sufficiently accurate expert assessments, at a price level that allows large scale testing, are technically feasible, and we identify routes to further improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Bekkers, Rudi & Tur, Elena M. & Henkel, Joachim & van der Vorst, Tommy & Driesse, Menno & Contreras, Jorge L., 2022. "Overcoming inefficiencies in patent licensing: A method to assess patent essentiality for technical standards," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(10).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:51:y:2022:i:10:s0048733322001135
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2022.104590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. BEKKERS Rudi & HENKEL Joachim & MAS TUR Elena & VAN DER VORST Tommy & DRIESSE Menno & KANG Byeongwoo & MARTINELLI Arianna & MAAS Wim & NIJHOF Bram & RAITERI Emilio & TEUBNER Lisa, 2020. "Pilot study for essentiality assessment of Standard Essential Patents," JRC Research Reports JRC119894, Joint Research Centre.
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    1. Lorenz Brachtendorf & Fabian Gaessler & Dietmar Harhoff, 2023. "Truly standard‐essential patents? A semantics‐based analysis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 132-157, January.
    2. Gamarra, Yanis Luca & Friedl, Gunther, 2023. "Declared essential patents and average total R&D expenditures per patent family," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(7).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Standard essential patents; Essentiality; Patent licensing; Technical standards;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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