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Getting what we vote for: A regression discontinuity test of ballot initiative outcomes

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  • Dronyk-Trosper, Trey

Abstract

What do voters really receive when they vote? This paper exploits 25 years of municipal level voting data in Massachusetts to identify the specific effects of voter approved ballots. In particular, this analysis attempts to determine the degree to which the median voter preferences are reflected in public expenditures. The findings suggest that voters see little change in expenditures, regardless of voting outcomes. To my knowledge, this paper is the first of its kind to directly link voting outcomes with non capital expenditure outcomes. This has important implications for discussing frictions that arise between voter preferences and local public expenditures.

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  • Dronyk-Trosper, Trey, 2017. "Getting what we vote for: A regression discontinuity test of ballot initiative outcomes," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 46-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:64:y:2017:i:c:p:46-56
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2017.02.001
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    2. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Fernando Ferreira & Jesse Rothstein, 2010. "The Value of School Facility Investments: Evidence from a Dynamic Regression Discontinuity Design," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 215-261.
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    4. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wenchi Wei, 2021. "State fiscal constraint and local overrides: a regression discontinuity design estimation of the fiscal effects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 347-373, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local budgets; Voting; Regression discontinuity; Education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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