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Local income taxation: An externality, Pigouvian solution, and public policies

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  • Goodspeed, Timothy J.

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  • Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1995. "Local income taxation: An externality, Pigouvian solution, and public policies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 279-296, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:25:y:1995:i:3:p:279-296
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    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-296, June.
    2. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
    3. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1993. "Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 117-132, August.
    4. Robert M. Schwab & Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Community Composition and the Provision of Local Public Goods: A Normative Analysis," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 12, pages 211-231, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Wheaton, William C., 1975. "Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 377-384, November.
    6. Westhoff, Frank, 1977. "Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 84-112, February.
    7. Flatters, Frank & Henderson, Vernon & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1974. "Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 99-112, May.
    8. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September.
    9. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1989. "A re-examination of the use of ability to pay taxes by local governments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 319-342, April.
    10. Harvey S. Rosen, 1988. "Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number rose88-1, March.
    11. Bergstrom, Ted C, 1979. " When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 216-226.
    12. Robert P. Inman, 1988. "Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States: The Evolution of a New," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, pages 33-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1998. "The Relationship Between State Income Taxes and Local Property Taxes: Education Finance in New Jersey," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(2), pages 219-238, June.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2010. "Mobility and Fiscal Imbalance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 63(4), pages 1023-1053, December.
    3. Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," Departmental Working Papers 200215, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    4. Horstmann, Ignatius J & Scharf, Kimberley, 1999. "The New Federalism: Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, 2003. "Strategic Inter–Regional Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 229-248, April.
    6. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1998. "Tax Competition, Benefit Taxes, and Fiscal Federalism," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 3), pages 579-86, September.
    7. Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2023. "Majority choice of taxation and redistribution in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    8. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(1), pages 89-101, March.
    9. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 1), pages 89-101, March.
    10. Ignatius J. Horstmann & Kimberley A. Scharf, 2008. "A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 427-453, March.
    11. Stephen M. Calabrese & Dennis N. Epple & Richard E. Romano, 2012. "Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1081-1111.
    12. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2016. "Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-101, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    13. Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2015. "Majority choice of tax systems in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 58-70.
    14. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2019. "Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    15. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2016. "Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization," WIDER Working Paper Series 101, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    16. Luca Gandullia, 2012. "The role of direct taxes in fiscal decentralization," DEP - series of economic working papers 6/2012, University of Genoa, Research Doctorate in Public Economics.
    17. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
    18. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2002. "Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 357-374, February.
    19. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1998. "Tax Competition, Benefit Taxes, and Fiscal Federalism," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(3), pages 579-586, September.

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