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Privatisation and market structure in a transition economy

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  • Bennett, John
  • Maw, James

Abstract

A model is developed in which an industry of N > I firms is privatized. The 'participation' method of privatization is used, whereby firms are sold for cash, but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership. In each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment, before output Is produced. The investment is unobservable by the state, and therefore noncontractible. Thae Is Cournot competition In the product market. The welfare-maximizing retained ownership share for the state is analyzed; taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 77 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 357-382

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:77:y:2000:i:3:p:357-382

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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References

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  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1996. "Transition as a process of large-scale institutional change," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(1), pages 1-30, 05.
  2. Grosfeld, I. & Roland, G., 1995. "Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central European Enterprises," DELTA Working Papers 95-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. Marc Duponcel, 1998. "Restructuring of food industries in the five Central and Eastern European front-runners towards EU membership (CEEC-5). A comparative review," CERT Discussion Papers 9806, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  4. Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992. "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," NBER Working Papers 4205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Susan J. Linz & Gary Krueger, 1998. "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanisms," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 152, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  6. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  7. Hans-Werner Sinn & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 1997. "Foreign direct investment, political resentment and the privatization process in eastern Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 177-210, 04.
  8. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
  9. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1994. "Transition in Poland," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1169-77, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2005. "Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 4871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Bibhas Saha, 2009. "Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 25-43, September.
  3. Bennett, John & Maw, James, 2003. "Privatization, partial state ownership, and competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-74, March.
  4. Chen, Chien-Hsun & Mai, Chao-Cheng & Liu, Yu-Lin & Mai, Shin-Ying, 2009. "Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1161-1171, November.
  5. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2011. "Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1465-1470, July.
  6. Walsh, Patrick Paul & Whelan, Ciara, 2001. "Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 85-112, June.
  7. Friberg, Richard & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2008. "Privatization, Investment and Ownership Efficiency," Working Paper Series 744, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  8. Hsu, Su-Ying & Lo, Chu-Ping & Wu, Shih-Jye, 2014. "The nexus of market concentration and privatization policy in mixed oligopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 196-203.
  9. Maw, James, 2002. "Partial privatization in transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 271-282, September.

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